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Abstract
This article investigates the interrelations between the initial mem-
bers of the Euro area and five important Central and Eastern European
economies. We set up a theoretical open economy model to derive the
Purchasing Power Parity, the Interest Rate Parity, the Fisher Infla-
tion Parity, and an output gap relation. After taking convergence into
account, they are used as restrictions on the cointegration space of a
structural vector error correction model. We then employ generalized
impulse response analysis to assess the dynamic effects of shocks in
output and interest rates on the respective other area as well as the
implications of shocks in the exchange rate and in relative prices on
both areas. The results show a high degree of interconnectedness be-
tween the two economies. There are strong positive spillovers in output
to the respective other region with the magnitude of the impact being
similarly strong in both areas. Furthermore, we find a multiplier effect
being present in Eastern Europe and some evidence for the European
Central Banks’ desire towards price stability.
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1 Introduction
In April 1989, the anti-communist Solidarność won the vast majority of avail-
able parliamentary seats in Poland which marked the beginning of a series
of peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Subsequently,
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania overthrew
their communist governments, which was followed by the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, there has been a remarkable
pace at which integration between Western Europe and some of the former
Warsaw Pact countries took place. While there were doubtlessly also back-
lashes, the overly successful process culminated in the accession of the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia to the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004. Bulgaria
and Romania followed suit on January 1, 2007. Since then, five of these
countries even managed to adopt the Euro as their single currency.
Various aspects of the relationship between the EU and CEE were deemed
to be of utmost economic importance over the last twenty years. While CEE
countries predominantly benefited from high Western European FDI inflows
and the prospect of EU accession, EU countries gained by having access
to new unsaturated markets (see for example Breuss, 2001; Matkowski and
Próchniak, 2007). Furthermore, barriers on the labor markets between the
EU and CEE were continuously removed (European Commission, 2008). De-
spite these facts, the interdependencies between the EU and CEE have not
been thoroughly investigated which is mainly due to a lack of sufficiently ac-
curate data and the unsatisfactory coverage of time series (Benkovskis et al.,
2011). We attempt to contribute in closing this gap by investigating the in-
terrelations between the 12 initial members of the Euro area (EU-12) and the
five Eastern European countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia (CEE-5). In so doing we make use of aggregate EU-12 data for
GDP, interest rates and prices and construct a corresponding data file for
the CEE-5 which additionally contains a price differential variable and an
artificial exchange rate between the two areas.1 Then we analyze the effects
1See Appendix B for details on the construction of the dataset.
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of shocks in output and in interest rates that hit one of the two areas as well
as shocks in the exchange rate and in relative prices in order to assess their
impact upon the other region. The methodology we rely on is based upon a
series of papers (Pesaran and Shin, 1998; Garratt et al., 1999, 2003, 2006),
where the authors argue in favor of using a structural vector error correc-
tion model (SVECM) combined with generalized impulse response analysis
to assess the effects of exogenous shocks on macroeconomic variables. The
advantage of this model class over other approaches like vector autoregres-
sive models (VARs), structural vector autoregressive models (SVARs) and
standard vector error correction models (VECs) is that theoretical long-run
relationships — which are deemed to be more credible than short-run rela-
tionships — are used to identify cointegrating relations and that the ordering
of endogenous variables neither matters for the cointegration space nor for
the impulse response analysis. Altogether this minimizes the investigator’s
need for arbitrary modeling choices.
As already indicated, the literature closely related to our purpose is rather
scarce. Most studies on the effects of macroeconomic shocks in the CEE
region exclusively consider domestic shocks. For example, the monetary
transmission mechanism in CEE countries has been studied extensively (see
Égert et al., 2006; Égert and MacDonald, 2008, for an assessment of the
interest pass-through and a survey on the monetary transmission mechanism
in CEE, respectively). Only a few analyses exist that consider the dynamic
effects of foreign shocks on CEE economies. Most recently, however, a couple
of studies have begun to devote greater attention to this issue. Jiménez-
Rodriguez et al. (2010) point out that the degree of homogeneity in the
response of future Euro area members to foreign shocks is one important
indicator to asses the preconditions for the well-functioning of an enlarged
monetary union. In investigating this issue, the Euro area and the United
States are considered as the foreign economy in a near VAR model that
allows for structural breaks in the constant, the trend, and the variance.
The analysis shows that while the response to commodity price shocks differs
among the ten CEE countries, a shock in the foreign interest rate leads to
a fall in industrial production in all and to a fall in prices in most of them.
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Moreover, an increase in foreign industrial production triggers an increase
in domestic industrial production as well as a real appreciation of domestic
currencies. The CEE countries show a high degree of homogeneity in most
of the responses to shocks in industrial production, indicating a good pre-
condition for joining the monetary union.
Benkovskis et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of monetary policy
shocks from the Euro area to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
They employ a factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) model and show that there
are substantial effects of Euro area monetary policy on economic activity in
the considered CEE countries which mainly work through the interest rate
channel and through changes in foreign demand. Furthermore, the exchange
rate is shown to be important in explaining movements in CEE prices.
In a recent contribution, Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) explore the trans-
mission of fiscal shocks from Germany to the CEE-5 countries. They use a
structural VAR model and show that while a fiscal expansion in Germany
triggers expansionary fiscal policy measures in all the five CEE countries
included, the effects on GDP differ among them. While output increases
in Poland and Hungary, it decreases in Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech
Republic. Altogether, the results confirm that there are strong interdepen-
dencies between Germany and the CEE-5 with respect to fiscal policy.
This short overview indicates that the empirical work is almost entirely
based on times series applications that lack a theoretical background or oth-
erwise focus on identification of shocks via short-run restrictions drawn from
the literature. However, two recent contributions are based upon the in-
sights of Pesaran and Shin (1998), Garratt et al. (1999), Garratt et al.
(2003) and Garratt et al. (2006) in order to analyze the effects of shocks
between two economic areas: Gaggl et al. (2009) investigate the Euro area
and the United States and use a dynamic open economy model to derive
five relations that may be used for identification of the long-run relation-
ships of the error correction part. The restricted VEC model is estimated
for each economy separately and generalized impulse response analysis is
carried out to reveal the effects of shocks in one economic area on the other
one and also to investigate differences in adjustment processes to deviations
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from long-run equilibria between the Euro area and the United States. In
an assessment of the transmission of shocks between Austria and Germany,
Prettner and Kunst (2011) modify the model of Garratt et al. (2006) to ac-
count for the integration of these countries’ labor markets. Their analysis
shows that economic shocks in Germany have significant and sizable impacts
on the Austrian economy, while corresponding shocks to Austrian variables
impact upon the German economy to a lesser extend.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no paper that applies a similar
modeling strategy like Garratt et al. (2006), Gaggl et al. (2009) and Pret-
tner and Kunst (2011) to the CEE region. However, there is one study worth
mentioning because it also applies long-run economic theory to restrict the
cointegration space of a VEC model. Passamani (2008) sets up a structural
cointegrated VAR model for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia, with the Euro area as foreign region. The authors incorporate interest
rate and purchasing power parity conditions as cointegrating relations and
test their validity to assess the underlying countries’ convergence processes.
The effects of international shocks are, however, not considered.
Our paper proceeds as follows: section 2 is devoted to a description of
the underlying theoretical framework on which we base our analysis, section
3 describes and assesses our econometric specification and in section 4 we
present the results regarding the impact of exogenous shocks hitting one area
on the other economy. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we rely on households’ dynamically optimal consumption-
savings decisions and on a neoclassical description of the production sides
of our model economies in deriving restrictions to be imposed on the cointe-
gration space of the SVECM. In so doing we generalize the model used by
Prettner and Kunst (2011) to allow for two different currencies in the two
economic areas we are investigating.
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2.1 Consumption Side
Following Prettner and Kunst (2011), we assume that in each of the economies
there is an infinitely lived representative household who chooses sequences
of consumption goods produced at home and abroad in order to maximize
its discounted stream of lifetime utility
max
{Ct}∞0 ,{C∗t }∞0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Cαt C
∗1−α
t
)
. (1)
In this expression β = 1/(1 + ρ) is the subjective discount factor with ρ > 0
being the discount rate, t is the time index with t = 0 referring to the present
year, Ct denotes consumption of the domestically produced aggregate which
we take as the numéraire good and an asterisk refers to the foreign econ-
omy such that C∗t describes consumption of the good produced abroad. We
assume that the utility function has a Cobb-Douglas representation with
0 < α < 1 being the share of the consumption aggregate produced at home.
The household has to fulfill a budget constraint such that its expenditures
and savings in period t are equal to its income in that very period. Further-
more, households are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint in the spirit of
Clower (1967) such that individuals are only allowed to consume from money
holdings in a certain period and not from capital or bonds. Altogether these
two constraints can be written as
Ct +
P ∗t
et
C∗t +Kt +Bt +
B∗t
et
+Mt = (1 + rt)Kt−1 + wtLt +
1 + it
1 + pit
Bt−1
+
1 + i∗t
1 + pi∗t
B∗t−1
et
+
Mt−1
1 + pit
, (2)
Ct +
P ∗t
et
C∗t ≤
Mt−1
1 + pit
, (3)
where P ∗t refers to the price level of the consumption aggregate produced in
the foreign country,Kt denotes the real capital stock, Bt are real bonds issued
by the corresponding government, et represents the nominal exchange rate
which states how much of the foreign currency one unit of the home currency
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is able to buy, Mt refers to individual’s real money holdings, rt denotes the
real rate of return on capital (which is equal to the real interest rate because
we abstract from depreciation), it represents the nominal interest rate on
governmental bonds, pit is the inflation rate, wt the real wage rate, and
Lt refers to labor supply, which we assume to be inelastically given by the
time constraint of the household. Since households are rational, they do not
want to hold more money than necessary to finance optimal consumption
in period t, which means that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with
equality. Altogether this leads us to the following results of the dynamic
optimization problem
CPIt =
CPI∗t
et
, (4)
1 + it
1 + pit
=
1 + i∗t
1 + pi∗t
et−1
et
, (5)
1 + rt =
1 + it
1 + pit
, (6)
where CPIt and CPI∗t denote the consumer price indices in the domestic
and foreign economy, respectively (see appendix A for the derivations and the
connection between consumer price indices and price levels of home and for-
eign consumption aggregates). The first equation represents the Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) relationship, stating that — adjusted for the nominal
exchange rate — the price levels in the two countries move in line. The sec-
ond equation refers to the Interest Rate Parity (IRP), stating that there is
no difference in the return on investments between home and foreign bonds.
The third equation represents the Fisher Inflation Parity (FIP), stating that
investments into government bonds and into physical capital should deliver
the same return. Altogether these conditions are ruling out arbitrage rents
(cf. Blanchard, 2003; Garratt et al., 2006; Gaggl et al., 2009) and are often
simply assumed to hold in related models.
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2.2 Production Side
The production side of the two economies closely follows that outlined in
Prettner and Kunst (2011) who build their description upon Garratt et al.
(2006) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Output at home is produced
according to a production function that can be written as
Yt = AtLtf(kt), (7)
with Yt denoting real output, f being an intensive form production function
fulfilling the Inada conditions, At referring to the technology level of the
economy and kt being the capital stock per unit of effective labor. Follow-
ing Garratt et al. (2006), the number of employed workers is assumed to
represent a fraction δ of the total population Nt such that
Lt = δNt. (8)
Consequently, the unemployment rate is equal to 1−δ. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that there are technology adoption barriers (cf. Parente and Prescott,
1994) such that
ηAt = θA
∗
t = A¯t, (9)
where A¯t is the technological level in the rest of the world and η > 0 and θ > 0
measure incompletenesses in technology adoption and diffusion. Putting
things together and dividing domestic by foreign output gives
yt
y∗t
=
θδ
ηδ∗
f(kt)
f(k∗t )
, (10)
where yt denotes per capita output. Equation (10) describes an output gap
(OG) relation in the sense that differences in output per capita between
the two economic areas can be explained by the relative size of technology
adoption/diffusion parameters, the relative size of employment rates and
different capital intensities.
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2.3 Stochastic Representations of the Restrictions
Taking logarithms of equations (4), (5), (6) and (10) and rearranging yields
log(CPIt) = log(CPI
∗
t )− log(et), (11)
log(1 + it)− log(1 + i∗t ) = log(1 + pit)− log(1 + pi∗t ),
+ log(et−1)− log(et) (12)
log(1 + it)− log(1 + pit) = log(1 + rt), (13)
log(yt)− log(y∗t ) = log [f(kt)] + log(θ) + log(δ)
− log [f(k∗t )]− log(η)− log(δ∗), (14)
which are deterministic relationships holding in a long-run equilibrium. In
the short run — during the adjustment process — these equations need
not be fulfilled with equality. Instead there are long-run errors denoted by 
measuring short-run deviations from these long-run relationships (cf. Garratt
et al., 2006). The stochastic counterparts to equations (11), (12), (13) and
(14) in terms of the endogenous variables of the SVECM therefore read
pt − p∗t + et = b1,0 + 1,t+1, (15)
it −∆pt = b2,0 + 2,t+1, (16)
it − i∗t = b3,0 + 3,t+1, (17)
yt − y∗t = b4,0 + 4,t+1, (18)
where the estimates of b1,0 and b2,0 are expected to be close to zero, the
estimate of b3,0 should reflect the logarithm of the real interest rate and
the estimate of b4,0 should reflect the differences in the logarithm of the
structural determinants of the output gap.
3 Econometric Model
If all endogenous variables are integrated of order one (I(1)), a general
SVECM including a constant term and a deterministic trend can be written
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as
A ∆zt = a˜+ b˜t− Π˜zt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γ˜i∆zt−i + u˜t, (19)
where A is a k × k matrix containing the contemporaneous effects between
endogenous variables included in the k×1 vector zt, ∆ refers to the differenc-
ing operator, a˜ and b˜ are the k×1 vectors of intercept and trend coefficients,
the matrices Π˜ and Γ˜i contain the coefficients of the error correction and the
autoregressive part, respectively, p is the lag length of endogenous variables
before differencing, and u˜t is a vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances
with mean zero and variance covariance matrix Ω (cf. Garratt et al., 2006).
In order to get to the reduced form, equation (19) has to be premultiplied
by A−1 such that we have
∆zt = a+ bt−Πzt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆zt−i + ut, (20)
with a = A−1a˜, b = A−1b˜ , Γi = A−1Γ˜i, Π = A−1Π˜, ut = A−1u˜t and the
variance covariance matrix of ut being A−1Ω(A−1)′. If all the variables in
zt are I(1) but there exist one or more stationary linear combinations β′zt,
the variables are said to be cointegrated and deviations from these station-
ary relationships can be regarded as deviations from long-run equilibria. If
there exist r such cointegrating relations, the matrix Π = αβ′ has rank r
with α representing a k× r matrix containing the coefficients measuring the
speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibria and β being a k × r ma-
trix containing the cointegrating relations. For exact identification of the
long-run relationships we would need to impose r2 restrictions on β. Usually
these restrictions are obtained by following Johansen (1988) and Johansen
(1991) in orthogonalyzing the cointegrating vectors by setting the jth entry
in the jth column vector of β to one and the other first r− 1 entries to zero.
This approach does not provide a clear economic interpretation such that we
will instead follow Garratt et al. (2006) and use the theoretical restrictions
derived in section 2 for identification.
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The vector of endogenous variables described in appendix B includes
the logarithm of the domestic output index yt, the logarithm of the do-
mestic interest rate index it, foreign2 inflation (as the first differences of
the logarithmic foreign price index p∗t ), the logarithm of the foreign in-
terest rate index i∗t , the price differential pt − p∗t with pt being the loga-
rithm of the domestic price index, the logarithm of the exchange rate in-
dex et and the logarithm of the foreign output index y∗t such that we have
z′t = (yt, it, ∆p∗t , i∗t , (pt − p∗t ), et, y∗t ). Therefore we consider the reduced
form model
∆zt = a− αβ′zt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆zt−i + Ψ∆ P ot + t, (21)
with the logarithm of the oil price index P ot being an exogenous variable
that is allowed to affect the endogenous variables contemporaneously, Ψi
representing the vector of the associated coefficients and the overidentifying
matrix β′oi defined by equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) reading
β′oi =

0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
 . (22)
The first row of this matrix refers to the PPP, the second row to the foreign
FIP, the third row to the IRP and the last row to the OG relation. Note
that in our estimation we do not allow for a time trend in the data but we
include a constant and a time trend in each cointegrating relation such that
the dimensions of α and β change accordingly. The reason for doing so is
to account for the convergence process of the CEE economies to the EU-12
(see for example Matkowski and Próchniak, 2007).
2Note that we use foreign inflation because the results of unit root tests presented in
appendix B prevent us from relying on EU-12 inflation. Hence we implement the CEE-5
FIP relationship.
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3.1 Implementing the Long-term Relations
The first step in the empirical analysis is to decide on the number of lags
to be included in the model and to find out the corresponding number of
cointegrating relations. We base the choice regarding the lag order on the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), as well as on residual analysis. As
compared to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the BIC favors more
parsimonious models. This is a particular advantage in our case because of
the limited sample size for CEE-5 data. Table 1 in appendix C shows the
two information criteria up to lag order five. As expected, the AIC suggests
the largest model with p = 5, while the BIC favors the smallest model
with p = 2. The associated rank and eigenvalue tests on the the number of
cointegrating relations are therefore based on a VAR(2) model. They suggest
the presence of four such relations which matches the theoretical results.
The residual analysis carried out after estimation shows that we do not face
serious problems regarding autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and structural
breaks with this model specification. Nevertheless, we carry out robustness
checks with regards to alternative model specifications in subsection 4.4.
Imposing all four relations derived in section 2 on the cointegration space
results in 28 restrictions on the matrix β. For exact identification only 16
such restrictions are required. Moreover, the theoretically implied structure
of the long term relationships might be overly strict and lifting them could
lead to more accurate estimation. We therefore also consider an exactly
identified version of matrix β, where we allow for partial adjustment and lift
part of the zero restrictions according to Garratt et al. (2006).3 In order to
assess the support of the data for either of the two structures, we employ a
likelihood ratio test on over-identifying restrictions. In so doing we follow
Garratt et al. (2006) and use non-parametric bootstrapping with re-sampling
to gain the appropriate critical values which would otherwise be biased in
small samples. In 2000 replications we obtain the upper 5% critial value
53.97. The test statistic resulting by comparing the overidentified model with
the exactly identified one exhibits a value of 93.69. The test hence rejects
3In particular, we lift the zero restrictions on β12, β13, β14, β27, β36, β42, β45, β46, β47.
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the tight, overidentified matrix in favour of the modified version. This result
suggests that allowing for partial adjustment and for a more flexible structure
of cointegrating relations could improve the estimation from a statistical
point of view. Furthermore, it represents our first empirical result, namely
that the integration of CEE-5 is not yet fully completed. This is consistent
with the results of Cuestas (2009) and Arghyroua et al. (2009).
However, the use of an exactly identified matrix introduces several dis-
advantages. Besides the looser implementation of theoretical considerations
regarding the two economies, the application of any certain exactly identified
matrix is an arbitrary choice.4 Furthermore, there would be disadvantages
with respect to the efficiency of our estimates because we face rather short
time series and the use of the exactly identified version implies the estimation
of 12 additional parameters. Finally, residual analysis indicates the presence
of autocorrelation in case of the exactly identified model which could lead to
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We therefore incorporate the
matrix that imposes the theoretical relations directly but compute impulse
responses of the exactly identified model as a robustness check. The com-
parison of the impulse responses of the two models shows that, overall, the
results do not change substantially (see section 4.4).
The results of the error correction specifications are presented in Ta-
ble 4 in appendix C. Altogether, the error correction terms appear mostly
to be significant, indicating that automatic adjustment back to stationary
relationships takes place.
The adequacy of the model is further assessed and compared to alter-
native specifications on the basis of a series of residual tests. Table 3 in
appendix C summarizes the results of the Jarque-Bera test on normality
and the White test on heteroscedasticity. Considering a significance level of
5%, the Jarque Bera test cannot reject the null hypothesis of normal dis-
tribution for all equations except for the price differential, while the White
test does not reject the null hypothesis of homosecdasticity for all equations
4To work with exactly identified matrices would request to either derive the structure
of that matrix according to a certain rule or to test many possible structures against each
other and then choose the best in terms of the likelihood.
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except the one referring to the EU-12 interest rate. Furthermore, we com-
pute the Portmanteau test on autocorrelation of the residuals. As shown in
table 2 in appendix C, autocorrelation does not seem to be a serious problem
either. Altogether, these results confirm the choice of the model size with
respect to the lag order. Finally, we perform the CUSUM test on parameter
stability being particularly relevant for the time series of Eastern European
countries. The results of this test, which are available from the authors upon
request, show that there is no significant indication of structural breaks in
the relationships among the time series at the 5% level.
4 The Dynamic Effects of International Shocks
In order to reveal the effects of shocks in output and in interest rates as well
as the effects of shocks in the exchange rate and in relative prices on the
EU-12 and the CEE-5 countries, we compute generalized impulse response
functions (GIRFs) by shocking the residuals of endogenous variables and
tracing their effects with a particular emphasis on the respective other area.
The procedure regarding the computation of generalized impulse response
functions has been suggested by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin
(1998). It circumvents the need for applying the Choleski decomposition and
hence the dependence of the results on the arbitrary ordering of endogenous
variables in the zt vector. Furthermore, we again apply a non-parametric
bootstrapping procedure with replacement relying on 2000 replications of
model estimations in order to compute 95% confidence intervals around the
impulse response functions.
4.1 Shocks to the Euro Area
We start with the responses to a 1% shock in EU-12 GDP, for which the
results are shown in Figure 1. The response function of domestic GDP
shows a significantly higher output level over a period of almost three years.
The effect diminishes slowly indicating that GDP growth decreases below its
potential rate for a certain time period such that the long-run impact of the
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shock is insignificant. In contrast to other studies (eg. Gaggl et al., 2009),
we do not observe a multiplier effect.
The shock in EU-12 GDP not only has an impact on domestic output
but also results in an immediate increase in CEE-5 output by 0.4%, yet the
dynamics are reeinforced in the subsequent quarters. Altogether the positive
spillovers to Eastern Europe stay significant for approximately two and a half
years.
In response to the positive shock in output, EU-12 interest rates increase
slightly, but the effect is not significant at the 5% level except between quar-
ters eight and eleven after the shock occured. There is also no significant
response of interest rates in CEE-5 for which the point estimate of the im-
pulse response function shows a decrease at first, followed by a later increase.
Neither the CEE-5 inflation rate nor the price differential show a significant
change in response to the EU-12 output shock. While it is not surprising
that there is no direct effect on inflation in Eastern Europe, the result is
interesting when interpreted together with the response function of the price
differential. Taken together, the two figures indicate that prices in the EU-12
increase in response to a positive output shock, which would be intuitive. Al-
together there is no significant effect of the positive Euro area output shock
on the exchange rate.
Figure 2 displays the effects of a shock in the EU-12 interest rate. First of
all, there is a strong impact on the EU-12 interest rate itself in the first two
quarters after the shock. The effect peaks at an increase in the interest rate
of 1.6% in the third quarter, while in the fourth quarter interest rates start
to decrease slowly with no significant long-run effect remaining. The interest
rate in CEE-5 increases slightly in response to the shock in EU-12 interest
rates but the effect is not significant at the 5% level until the fourth quarter
after the shock took place. In the long-run, after around nine quarters, the
response of CEE-5 interest rates turn insignificant again. Another interesting
result is that the shock to the interest rate has a small dampening effect
on EU-12 output setting in after three quarters and getting stronger and
significant over time with the response of CEE-5 GDP following a similar
pattern. In the long run and for both areas, the response of output turns
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Figure 1: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to EU-12 GDP
insignificant confirming neutrality of monetary policy. There is no significant
response of the price differential and CEE-5 inflation, although according to
the point estimates there is a slight reduction in Eastern European price
pressures, with Euro area inflation supposedly decreasing by less such that
the point estimate of the price differential increases.
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Altogether, the responses to a shock in the EU-12 interest rate are in line
with the literature. With respect to the effect on output, most studies report
a decline which sets in after two to six quarters and returns to the pre-shock
level after approximately three years (see Barigozzi et al. (2011), Boivin et al.
(2009), van Els et al. (2003), Peersman and Smets (2001), Cecioni and Neri
(2011) and Gaggl et al. (2009), where the effect is permanent). Similar to
Benkovskis et al. (2011), we do not only observe a decline in EU-12 GDP but
a spillover effect to the CEE region resulting in a decline in CEE-5 output
in the same order of magnitude as in the EU-12. As compared to other
studies we neither observe an indication for a price puzzle, i.e., an increase
in consumer prices in response to a monetary tightening (Weber et al., 2009;
European Central Bank, 2010; Cecioni and Neri, 2011), nor for a decrease in
prices (Christoffel et al., 2008). However, in contrast to these studies, we can
only assess price movements in the EU-12 relative to the CEE-5. We do not
find evidence for an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in response
to monetary tightening which contrasts Barigozzi et al. (2011). The reason
might be that we have a two-country model that not only allows domestic
variables to respond to the interest rate shock but also foreign GDP and
interest rates.
4.2 Shocks to Eastern Europe
Figure 3 shows the generalized impulse responses to a 1% shock in CEE-5
output. The variable itself reacts to its own shock with the dynamics being
reinforced in the successive quarters apparently due to a slight multiplier
effect being present in Eastern Europe. The initial 1% shock translates into
an increase of approximately 1.2% after one year. Subsequently, the response
of output starts to decay slowly from the peak effect and turns insignificant
after around two years. The shock of CEE-5 GDP does not only show a
strong response in Eastern Europe itself but there are substantial positive
spillover effects to the EU-12 which are approximately as strong as in the
reverse case. Starting from a direct increase of EU-12 GDP amounting to
0.5% in the first quarter, the effect peaks at an overall 0.9% in the third
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Figure 2: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to EU-12 Interest
Rates
quarter after the shock. The positive response of EU-12 GDP due to an
increase in demand from CEE-5 is significant on the 5% level but only for
around two years. The latter could be explained by the significant positive
reaction of EU-12 interest rates potentially indicating the strong desire of
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the European Central Bank for price stability.
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Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to CEE-5 GDP
According to the point estimate, the shock in CEE-5 GDP furthermore
results in an appreciation of the currencies of these countries by 3% in the
first quarters following the shock. This seems to help offsetting the positive
impact that higher output would have had on the price level without an
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adjustment in the exchange rate. According to the point estimate, the in-
significant response of inflation in CEE-5 shows a slight upward pressure on
prices. Due to the fact that inflation does not react significantly, there is no
clear response in the price differential. While the interest rate in CEE-5 is
in general not increasing significantly, it does so in the Euro area for almost
two years.
The responses to an interest rate shock in CEE-5 are given in figure 4.
Although in general not significant at the 5% level, the responses of the out-
put levels of both economies point to a slight dampening effect in the first
quarters following the shock. The pattern shows that the dampening effect
of higher CEE-5 interest rates on output is more pronounced for Eastern
European GDP which would have been expected. In contrast to a shock in
EU-12 interest rates, the corresponding shock in CEE-5 only leads to signif-
icant responses of Eastern European interest rates themselves but does not
seem to transmit to the other economy. Again it is interesting to look at the
time pattern of CEE-5 inflation in relation to the price differential in order
to gain insights where a movement in price levels comes from. In this case,
we do not find a significant impact on CEE-5 inflation, although the point
estimate indicates a decrease in the inflation rate after the third quarter. At
the same time, we see that the price differential decreases significantly in the
first quarter. This indicates that while prices in Eastern Europe need some
time to adjust, there is a much faster adjustment in the Euro area.
As Égert and MacDonald (2008) point out, there is substantial disagree-
ment in the literature concerning the effects of interest rate shocks on the
CEE region. Our results seem to resemble very much the results of Creel
and Levasseur (2005) who also observe a price puzzle accompanied with an
exchange rate puzzle, but a weak and late dampening effect on GDP. As in
Darvas (2006), the full impact of the interest rate shock on CEE-5 output
needs some time to materialize.
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to CEE-5 Interest
Rates
4.3 Shocks to the Exchange Rate and to Relative Prices
Figure 5 shows the responses to a positive 1% shock in the exchange rate
which is tantamount to an 1% appreciation of the Euro. After the immedi-
ate impact there is a further appreciation to 1.1% in the subsequent quarter.
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Afterwards, the effects of the shock decay and become insignificant after six
quarters. The shock to the exchange rate affects the interest rates in the Euro
area as well as in Eastern Europe. While the EU-12 interest rate decreases
significantly in the first four quarters by approximately 2.6%, interest rates
in CEE-5 tend to increase significantly by over 1% for around three quarters.
Looking at the price movements in the two economies, there is a decrease
in relative prices, implying that Euro area products become less expensive
relative to Eastern European products in response to an appreciation of the
Euro. This is exactly what we would expect in case of constant real exchange
rates as implied by the PPP. The positive effect on Eastern European infla-
tion indicates that the more expensive imports from the EU-12 contribute
to raising the price level of consumption there. Price movements partly off-
set the loss in competitiveness induced by a Euro appreciation, and hence
real GDP in EU-12 and CEE-5 does not react significantly. Altogether this
suggests that a loss in competitiveness induced by a nominal appreciation of
the Euro is to a substantial extent offset by lower inflation. The dampening
effect of an appreciation on inflation is, however, relatively low as compared
to other studies on the exhange rate pass through in CEE (e.g. Beirne and
Bijsterbosch, 2009).
Finally, we compute the responses to a positive shock in relative prices
in order to gain insights about the effects of relative consumer price changes
between the two economies which are shown in figure 6. A positive shock
in the relative price level significantly impacts upon the relative price level
itself and on Eastern European inflation. The response of the price differen-
tial shows that an initial 1% shock leads to higher Euro area prices relative
to prices in Eastern Europe by 0.6-0.8% within the first year. The time
pattern of the response suggests that this effect is a permanent one. The
increase in the relative price level is reflected by a strong and significant
negative response in Eastern European inflation. Although our model does
not contain information on Euro area inflation, an increase in the relative
price level could also be related to an increase in EU-12 inflationary pres-
sure. The strong negative response of Eastern European inflation, however,
suggests that a great part of the impact is associated with price movements
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Figure 5: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to the Exchange
Rate
there. As a consequence to lower inflation, Eastern European interest rates
decline, while EU-12 interest rates increase. The former effect is significant
for around four quarters, while the latter effect teeters on the edge of in-
significance for around ten quarters. Besides that, we find that the exchange
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Figure 6: Generalized Impulse Responses to a 1% Shock to the Price Differ-
ential
rate again partly offsets the increase in the relative price levels because there
is a significant depreciation of the Euro in response to such a shock.
24
4.4 Robustness Checks
When choosing the lag order in equation (20), we decided to rely on the BIC
which suggests the smallest possible model, a VEC(1). As a first robustness
check we therefore analyzed the results of a similar model with a lag order of
two and compared the impulse responses to the ones described. They show
the same directions for all kinds of shocks discussed in the previous section.
Nevertheless, the results change in two respects. First, the phase-out of a
one time shock shows a more oscillating pattern and second, the responses
to shocks diminish very slowly. In our view, this additionally supports the
choice of a smaller model, especially in light of the rather short data series
available.
As discussed in subsection 3.1, directly imposing the theoretical relations
might be overly tight and relaxing the structure on the cointegration space
could therefore improve the estimation from a statistical point of view. Con-
sequently, we also compute the impulse responses of the exactly identified
model. There are no major changes with respect to GDP shocks originat-
ing from the EU-12. The shape and the time pattern do not change for
most of the variables except for EU-12 and CEE-5 output, where the re-
sponses now show a multiplier effect that increases output above the original
shock. Concerning the effects of the interest rate shock in the EU-12, the
exactly identified model delivers a positive response of EU-12 output, while
all the other responses stay the same as compared to the benchmark model.
However, EU-12 interest rates show a stronger increase in the first quarters
following the shock than in the benchmark model.
In contrast to the over-identified framework, the increase in inflation
following a CEE-5 output shock is now significant. Responses do not change
much for CEE-5 interest rates and the price differential and also the positive
increase in the EU-12 interest rate is still there in the exactly identified
case. We also find the same positive spillover effect to EU-12 output. As
before, CEE-5 inflation increases and we observe a slight increase in the
exchange rate in the first quarter following a shock in CEE-5 interest rates.
We do not find an impact on neither EU-12 nor CEE-5 output. The EU-12
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interest rate does not react significantly, even though the CEE-5 interest rate
now increases stronger in response to its own shock in the second and third
quarter.
With respect to shocks in the exchange rate and the price differential, the
responses are very similar to the ones obtained by the over-identified model
and do — if at all — only differ slightly in their shape and time pattern.
Overall, therefore, our results seem to be robust against the change in
the lag order. Employing the suggested exactly identified cointegration struc-
ture instead of the over-identified model would also not change the results
qualitatively.
5 Conclusions
We investigated the interrelations between initial members of the Euro area
and five important Central and Eastern European economies. In so doing
we made use of a structural vector error correction approach that minimizes
the dependence of the final results on arbitrary modeling assumptions. The
need to impose a causal recursive ordering on impulse response functions is
circumvent by using generalized impulse response functions instead of the
Choleski decomposition, while the need to rely on arbitrary orthogonaliza-
tions of cointegrating vectors is dealt with by using theoretically derived
relationships as restrictions on the cointegration space instead of relying on
the standard approach advocated by Johansen (1988) and Johansen (1991).
Model diagnoses show that there are no significant structural breaks left
and that autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and non-normality of the resid-
uals do not seem to pose substantial problems. A bootstrapped likelihood
ratio test indicated that overidentifying restrictions are overly tight. How-
ever, the resulting exactly identified model suffered from more severe prob-
lems and the results of generalized impulse response functions were therefore
computed on the basis of the overidentified model for the benchmark case.
However, we used the exactly identified model for robustness checks of the
results. All in all, the use of a structural vector error correction model with
long-run restrictions for the purpose of modeling the dynamic interactions
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between the two economies is supported and the impulse responses reveal a
high degree of interconnectedness of Eastern Europe and the Euro area.
In general, our results show responses that confirm standard economic
intuition. Output levels in EU-12 and CEE-5 respond positively to output
shocks in the corresponding foreign region with the impact being similarly
strong in Eastern Europe as in the Euro area. This emphasizes the impor-
tance of Eastern Europe as an extended market for the EU-12. Another im-
portant result is that we identify the presence of multiplier effects in Eastern
Europe with mixed evidence for a similar effect in the Euro area. Further-
more, we find that interest rates in the Euro area show a strong response to
shocks in output, no matter if domestic or foreign shocks are considered. We
regard this as some evidence for the European Central Banks’ desire towards
price stability. The analysis of interest rate shocks shows strong responses in
output of both economies when EU-12 interest rates are concerned but only
weak effects on output for shocks in Eastern European interest rates. While
increases in EU-12 interest rates translate into rising CEE-5 interest rates,
the reverse is not the case. Finally, with respect to relative price and ex-
change rate shocks, we find offsetting effects that tend to prevent substantial
changes in relative competitiveness.
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Appendix
A Dynamic Optimization of the Representative Con-
sumer
The Lagrangian of the consumer optimization problem reads
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{Cαt C∗1−αt + λt[(1 + rt)Kt−1 + wtLt +
1 + it
1 + pit
Bt−1 +
+
1 + i∗t
1 + pi∗t
B∗t−1
et
+
Mt−1
1 + pit
− Ct − P
∗
t
et
C∗t −Bt
−B
∗
t
et
−Kt −Mt] + µt[ Mt−1
1 + pit
− Ct − P
∗
t
et
C∗t ]}. (23)
The corresponding first order conditions are
∂L
∂Ct
!
= 0 ⇒ βt[αCα−1t C∗1−αt − λt − µt] = 0, (24)
∂L
∂C∗t
!
= 0 ⇒ βt[Cαt (1− α)C∗(−α)t − λt
P ∗t
et
− µtP
∗
t
et
] = 0, (25)
∂L
∂Mt
!
= 0 ⇒ βt+1
[
λt+1
1 + pit+1
+
µt+1
1 + pit+1
]
− βtλt = 0, (26)
∂L
∂Kt
!
= 0 ⇒ βt+1λt+1(1 + rt+1)− βtλt = 0, (27)
∂L
∂Bt
!
= 0 ⇒ βt+1λt+1 1 + it+1
1 + pit+1
− βtλt = 0, (28)
∂L
∂B∗t
!
= 0 ⇒ βt+1λt+1
1 + i∗t+1
1 + pi∗t+1
1
et+1
− βtλt
et
= 0. (29)
Equations (27) and (28) lead to
1 + rt =
1 + it
1 + pit
(30)
which is the Fisher Inflation Parity (FIP). Equations (28) and (29) lead to
1 + it
1 + pit
=
1 + i∗t
1 + pi∗t
et−1
et
(31)
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which is the Interest Rate Parity (IRP). The first order conditions for con-
sumption yield
Ct =
α
1− α
P ∗t
et
C∗t . (32)
Plugging the expressions for Ct and C∗t into the budget constraint and uti-
lizing the following definitions
St = St(rt, it, i
∗
t , pit, pi
∗
t )
= Bt +
B∗t
et
+Mt +Kt, (33)
It = It(rt, it, i
∗
t , pit, pi
∗
t )
= wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt−1 +
Mt−1
1 + pit
+
1 + it
1 + pit
Bt−1
+
1 + i∗t
1 + pi∗t
B∗t−1
et
, (34)
where St denotes a household’s savings and It refers to its income, yields
demand for goods produced at home and abroad
Ct = α(It − St), (35)
C∗t = (1− α)
It − St
P ∗t
. (36)
These equations imply that a share α of household’s income net of savings
is spent on the domestically produced aggregate, whereas a fraction 1 − α
is spent on the aggregate produced abroad. Since preferences of households
in the two economies are symmetric, the consumer price indices in both
countries are weighted averages of the price levels for the goods produced at
home and abroad with α and (1 − α)/et representing the weights at home
and etα and 1− α representing the weights abroad. Therefore
CPIt = α+ (1− α)P
∗
t
et
CPI∗t = etα+ (1− α)P ∗t
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holds, where CPIt and CPI∗t denote the consumer price indices in the do-
mestic and foreign economy, respectively. Consequently,
CPIt =
CPI∗t
et
(37)
has to be fulfilled. This equation represents the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) relationship.
B Data
We employ aggregate quarterly data for the EU-12 countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the CEE-5 countries (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) from 1995 to 2009. We use the
following definitions
yt: Logarithm of real GDP per capita index of EU-12
y∗t : Logarithm of real GDP per capita index of CEE-5
it: Logarithm of nominal 3 month money market interest rate index of
EU-12
i∗t : Logarithm of nominal 3 month money market interest rate index of
CEE-5
p∗t : Logarithm of CEE-5 Consumer Price Index (CPI)
pt − p∗t : Price differential between EU-12 and CEE-5 in terms of CPIs
et: Logarithm of the nominal exchange rate index between EU-12 and
CEE-5
P ot : Logarithm of the Brent spot price index of crude oil
where the base of indices is the first quarter of 1995 and we used the relative
size of a countries’ GDP to calculate the quarterly weight when we had to
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construct an aggregate series out of individual countries’ data series. For the
exchange rate we used weighted percentage changes of national currencies as
compared to the Euro in order to construct an index of an artificial currency
for the CEE-5 countries. Most of the data stem from Eurostat, except of the
CPI, where we collected data from the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF, and the Brent spot price of crude oil which was gathered from the
Energy Information Administration.
Unit root tests in general suggest treating all variables as integrated of
order one (I(1)), except CEE-5 consumer prices which are indicated to be
integrated of order two (I(2)). This means that CEE-5 inflation is I(1) and
can hence be used in the vector error correction part of our model together
with all the other data which is also I(1). Since unit root tests did not find
any indication of EU-12 inflation to be I(1), we were not able to use this
variable in the zt vector and hence changed the theoretically suggested FIP
relationship to hold in Eastern Europe instead of the Euro area. Additional
more detailed information with regards to the data series we use and the
results of the unit root tests are available from the authors upon request.
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C Tables
Table 1: Lag order selection
AIC BIC
2 LAGS -43.15478 -39.42466
3 LAGS -43.17237 -37.65255
4 LAGS -44.08962 -36.74772
5 LAGS -44.69158 -35.49434
Table 2: Portmanteau Test on Autocorrelation
LAG ∆(YEA) ∆(IEA) ∆(PEE) ∆(IEE) ∆(PD) ∆(E) ∆(YEE)
1 0.445 0.025 0.431 0.542 0.981 0.32 0.438
2 0.741 0.064 0.095 0.785 0.54 0.317 0.545
3 0.67 0.131 0.195 0.882 0.581 0.425 0.135
4 0.794 0.116 0.108 0.738 0.201 0.166 0.06
5 0.868 0.028 0.157 0.357 0.278 0.256 0.045
6 0.826 0.047 0.209 0.231 0.351 0.365 0.054
7 0.889 0.074 0.226 0.307 0.444 0.381 0.076
8 0.509 0.111 0.305 0.353 0.536 0.414 0.103
9 0.435 0.135 0.388 0.376 0.625 0.387 0.14
10 0.41 0.189 0.444 0.411 0.684 0.479 0.185
11 0.262 0.215 0.436 0.499 0.762 0.472 0.246
12 0.296 0.271 0.345 0.542 0.731 0.481 0.316
13 0.41 0.308 0.141 0.553 0.614 0.378 0.354
14 0.262 0.363 0.186 0.631 0.687 0.449 0.418
15 0.296 0.353 0.223 0.628 0.739 0.318 0.402
Table 3: Model Fit, Normality Test and White Test
∆(YEA) ∆(IEA) ∆(PEE) ∆(IEE) ∆(PD) ∆(E) ∆(YEE)
R¯2 0.496007 0.686718 0.202989 0.369729 0.113996 0.387678 0.474091
Jarque-Bera 0.1656 0.3671 0.0943 0.2196 0.0459 0.0677 0.1791
White 0.1948 0.019 0.136 0.466 0.0603 0.0797 0.2243
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Table 4: Reduced form error correction specification for the benchmark
model
∆(Y EA) ∆(IEA) ∆(∆PEE) ∆(IEE) ∆(PD) ∆(E) ∆(Y EE)
CE1 0.0218 0.0981 0.0146 0.3715 -0.0142 -0.0997 -0.0250
-0.0189 -0.2933 -0.0133 -0.2392 -0.0125 -0.0880 -0.0169
[ 1.1527] [ 0.3346] [ 1.0997] [ 1.5531] [-1.1340] [-1.1333] [-1.4747]
CE2 -0.0060 -0.1662 0.0000 -0.0881 0.0003 -0.0389 -0.0171
-0.0049 -0.0763 -0.0035 -0.0623 -0.0033 -0.0229 -0.0044
[-1.2241] [-2.1764] [ 0.0020] [-1.4160] [ 0.1002] [-1.6988] [-3.8905]
CE3 -0.0048 -0.0146 0.0045 0.1029 -0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0041
-0.0031 -0.0484 -0.0022 -0.0394 -0.0021 -0.0145 -0.0028
[-1.5388] [-0.30090] [ 2.0695] [ 2.6086] [-2.1709] [-0.5042] [-1.4721]
–
CE4 -0.0336 -0.1978 -0.0182 -2.0503 0.0224 -0.2823 0.0026
-0.0548 -0.8507 -0.0385 -0.6936 -0.0363 -0.2552 -0.0491
[-0.6128] [-0.2326] [-0.4715] [-2.9559] [ 0.6168] [-1.1062] [ 0.0537]
∆(Y EAt−1 ) -0.1918 3.5291 0.1882 0.2323 -0.0727 -0.0268 0.1266
-0.1472 -2.2848 -0.1035 -1.8630 -0.0975 -0.6854 -0.1319
[-1.3032] [ 1.5446] [ 1.8188] [ 0.1247] [-0.7451] [-0.0391] [ 0.9599]
∆(IREAt−1) 0.0001 0.2602 -0.0090 -0.0063 0.0079 0.0388 0.0014
-0.0083 -0.1285 -0.0058 -0.1048 -0.0055 -0.0385 -0.0074
[ 0.0089] [ 2.02524 [-1.5422] [-0.0598] [ 1.4427] [ 1.0059] [ 0.1875]
∆(PEEt−1) 0.1823 5.3970 -0.2644 1.5839 -0.1967 -0.2190 0.7733
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∆(Et−1) -0.0731 -1.5575 0.0354 -0.1436 -0.0302 0.1899 0.0090
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[ 2.4872] [ 1.1136] [ 0.5642] [-1.2067] [-1.3537] [-2.5735] [ 0.0919]
R¯2 0.496007 0.686718 0.202989 0.369729 0.113996 0.387678 0.474091
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